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Abstract—In LTE networks, key update and residence man-
agement have been investigated as an effective solution to
cope with desynchronization attacks in mobility management
entity (MME) handovers. In this paper, we first analyse the
impacts of the key update interval (KUI) and MME residence
interval (MRI) on the handover performance in terms of the
number of exposed packets (NEP) and signaling overhead rate
(SOR). By deriving the bounds of the NEP and SOR over
the KUI and MRI, it is shown that there exists a tradeoff
between the NEP and the SOR, while our aim is to minimise
both of them simultaneously. This accordingly motivates us
to propose a multiobjective optimisation problem to find the
optimal KUI and MRI that minimise both the NEP and
SOR. By introducing a relative importance factor between the
SOR and NEP along with their derived bounds, we further
transform the proposed optimisation problem into a single-
objective optimisation problem which can be solved via a
simple numerical method. In particular, the results show that a
higher accuracy of up to 1 second is achieved with the proposed
approach while requiring a lower complexity compared to the
conventional approach employing iterative searches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The LTE network supports two types of handovers, i.e.
intra and inter mobility management entity (MME) han-
dovers [1]–[3]. In the intra MME handover, i.e. when a user
equipment (UE) moves from a source to a target eNodeB1
within the same MME, the source eNodeB provides the
target eNodeB with a new session key2 to be used after
handover. The new key is generated from the current one
by either utilising a one-way function, a.k.a. backward key
separation process, or adding fresh materials to the process
of generating the new one, a.k.a. forward key separation
process. As eNodeBs are exposed to the public locations
and the internet-protocol-architecture nature of the network,
handover-key management process is vulnerable to attacks
deployed by bogus eNodeBs [5]. Such attacks are referred
to as desynchronization attacks [6], [7].
The aim of desynchronization attacks is to prevent target
eNodeBs from adding the fresh materials thus breaking
the forward key separation process. Consequently, attacker
can either decipher the communications between a genuine
eNodeB and a UE or compromise all future keys between
1A node/access-point provides all radio access protocols.
2Session keys are used to encrypted messages, i.e. user data and signaling
packets, exchanged between a UE and its serving eNodeB [4].
specific UEs and eNodeBs for further active attacks. The
effects of desynchronization attacks will be terminated at
the next update of the root key when handover key materials
are generated from scratch instead of deriving from previous
keys. The root key update is requested by a UE or happens
when a UE moves from one to another MME, i.e. inter
MME handover [8], [9].
Determining the root key update interval (KUI) has been
identified as an effective solution to tackle the desynchro-
nization attacks, see e.g. [6], [10], [11]. In [6], a mathemat-
ical model was developed to represent the average number
of exposed packages (NEP) between two root key updates
and the average value of signaling overhead rate (SOR)3. A
heuristic algorithm was also proposed in [6] to search for an
optimal root KUI based on empirical data. However, such
iterative search requires a high computational complexity
causing a considerable handover processing delay, especially
when considering a large network with a large number of
nodes.
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of not only KUI
but also MME residence interval (MRI) on the handover
performance in terms of NEP and SOR. Specifically, in
order to provide insightful meanings of the NEP and SOR
expressions, we first derive their upper and lower bounds
over the KUI and MRI. The derived bounds are helpful not
only in capturing their behaviours at the boundary values
of the KUI and MRI, but also in showing that there exists
a trade-off between the NEP and the SOR. However, our
aim is to minimise both of them. Therefore, as a second
contribution of this paper, we propose a multiobjective
optimisation problem to find the optimal KUI and MRI that
minimise both the NEP and SOR. Due to the two objectives,
i.e. NEP and SOR, are conflicting, a relative importance
parameter is introduced to balance these two objectives
with priority, and consequently allows us to convert the
multiobjective optimisation problem to a single-objective
optimisation problem which can be solved via a simple
numerical method using the derived bounds of the NEP
3The SOR is defined as the average number of bits for individ-
ual authentication among the UEs, the MME and the home subscriber
server/authentication centre during MME handover. The analysis of authen-
tication transmission overhead as well as impacts of the handover process
and security issues with encrypted keys can be referred to in [12]–[16].
Fig. 1: Timing diagram of MME residence with key update and vulnerable attack periods [6].
and SOR. The proposed method can therefore avoid the
conventional iterative searches in [6]; hence, it not only
reduces the complexity but also improves the reliability,
which in turns reflects the novelty of our work in deriving
the aforementioned bounds.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates the timing diagram of MME residence
in a typical LTE network [6]. Consider the following times
in a chronological order 𝜏1, 𝜏2, 𝜏3 and 𝜏4. At 𝜏1 and 𝜏4, a
UE enters and leaves the MME area, respectively. Let 𝑡𝑅 =
𝜏4−𝜏1 be a full MME residence time. At 𝜏2 and 𝜏3, there are
a desynchronization attack and a root key update requested
by the UE, respectively. The effect of a desynchronization
attack will be eliminated at either the time of the update
of the root key or the time when the UE leaves the MME.
Let 𝑡𝑈 = 𝜏3 − 𝜏1 be the interval time of the key update.
Furthermore, let 𝑡𝑢 = 𝜏3 − 𝜏2 and 𝑡𝑟 = 𝜏4 − 𝜏2 denote
the key exposure times. The vulnerable period 𝑡𝑐 is defined
as min{𝑡𝑢, 𝑡𝑟} where 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑢 < 𝑡𝑅 and 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑟 < 𝑡𝑅. If
𝜏3 ≤ 𝜏2, then 𝑡𝑐 = 𝑡𝑟.
Following the same approach in [6], let us assume that
KUI, i.e. 𝑡𝑈 , follows an exponential distribution with mean
of 𝑇𝑈 = 1/𝜇𝑢 where 𝜇𝑢 is the key update rate, and MRI,
i.e. 𝑡𝑅, follows a gamma distribution [17] with a shape
parameter of 𝑘 ≥ 0, mean of 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑘/𝜇𝑟 and variance
of 𝜎2𝑅 = 𝑘/𝜇2𝑟 where 𝜇𝑟 represents the mobility rate.
III. BOUNDS OF THE NEP AND SOR
During the vulnerable period, i.e. 𝑡𝑐, user data and sig-
naling packets exchanged between the UE and eNodeB are
exposed to eavesdroppers. The average number of exposed
packets (NEP), i.e. 𝐸[𝑁 ], and the average signalling over-
head rate (SOR), i.e. 𝐸[𝑆], can be expressed as in [6], i.e.
𝐸[𝑁 ] =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
(
1− 𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢𝑘
(
1−
(
𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟
)𝑘))
, (1)
𝐸[𝑆] =
𝜌
1
𝜇𝑢
+
𝑘
𝜇𝑟
, (2)
where 𝜆𝑝 is the mean arrival rate of packets exchanged
between the UE and eNodeB, and 𝜌 is the number of bits in
the messages for individual authentication among the UEs,
the MME and the home subscriber server/authentication
centre.
In order to provide insightful meanings of the above
expressions, let us derive the limits of the average NEP and
SOR as the average root KUI 𝑇𝑈 and MRI 𝑇𝑅 approach
0 and ∞. The findings are presented in the following three
lemmas.
Lemma 1. The average NEP, i.e. 𝐸[𝑁 ], is an increasing
function of 𝑇𝑈 ∈ (0,∞), which is lower bounded by
𝑁
(𝑇𝑈 )
min = 0 and upper bounded by
𝑁 (𝑇𝑈 )max =
𝜆𝑝(𝑘 + 1)
2𝜇𝑟
. (3)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The average NEP, i.e. 𝐸[𝑁 ], is an increasing
function of 𝑇𝑅 ∈ (0,∞), which is upper bounded by
𝑁 (𝑇𝑅)max =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
, (4)
while it is lower bounded by
𝑁
(𝑇𝑅)
min =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
(
1 +
𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢
log
(
𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟
))
(5)
when 𝑘 → 0 and 𝑁 (𝑇𝑅)min = 0 when 𝜇𝑟 →∞.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3. The average SOR, i.e. 𝐸[𝑆], is a decreasing
function of both 𝑇𝑈 ∈ (0,∞) and 𝑇𝑅 ∈ (0,∞), in which
both are lower bounded by 0, while they are upper bounded
by
𝑆(𝑇𝑈 )max =
𝜌𝜇𝑟
𝑘
=
𝜌
𝑇𝑅
, (6)
𝑆(𝑇𝑅)max = 𝜌𝜇𝑢 =
𝜌
𝑇𝑈
. (7)
Proof. (6) and (7) can be easily obtained from (2) with a
notice that 𝑇𝑈 = 1/𝜇𝑢 and 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑘/𝜇𝑟.
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 indicate a fact that reducing either
the KUI or MRI lowers the risk of security breaches, i.e.
reducing NEPs, at the cost of an increase in signaling
overhead. Hence, minimising the average NEP over either
𝑇𝑈 or 𝑇𝑅 is contradicting with minimising the average SOR.
In the next Section, we introduce a method to find optimal
values of 𝑇𝑈 and 𝑇𝑅 in order to balance between the two
conflicting objectives.
IV. OPTIMAL KUI & MRI
We first bring the average NEP and SOR into the same
scale by defining the following normalised functions
𝑆(𝑥) = 𝐸[𝑆]/𝑆(𝑥)max, (8)
𝑁(𝑥) = 𝐸[𝑁 ]/𝑁 (𝑥)max, (9)
where 𝑥 ∈ {𝑇𝑈 , 𝑇𝑅}, and 𝑁 (𝑇𝑈 )max , 𝑆(𝑇𝑈 )max , 𝑁 (𝑇𝑅)max and 𝑆(𝑇𝑅)max
are given by (3), (6), (4), (7), respectively. From Lemmas 1,
2 and 3, one can show that 𝑆(𝑥) and 𝑁(𝑥) are decreasing
and increasing functions, respectively, with respect to 𝑥.
Since 𝑆(𝑥) and 𝑁(𝑥) are contradicting functions over
𝑥, finding an optimal 𝑥 that minimises both functions is
actually to solve the following multiobjective optimisation
problem4 [18]:
min
𝑥∈[0,∞)
f (𝑥) = min
x∈[0,∞)
(𝑆 (𝑥) , 𝑁 (𝑥)) . (10)
Generally, there is no single solution that simultaneously op-
timises the above two conflicting objectives. However, there
exists a set of Pareto optimal solutions, i.e. Pareto frontier
[18], [19]. The Pareto frontier is obtained by specifying the
priority of each objective which is normally decided by the
network operator. In the following, we address a typical
scenario that the network operator would be using5.
Let 𝜈(𝑥) = 𝑁(𝑥)/𝑆(𝑥) denote the ratio of the normalised
NEP to the normalised SOR. Furthermore let 𝛿 be the
relative importance determined by the network operator as
the ratio of NEP to SOR. We now introduce the following
single-objective optimisation problem to find the optimal
solution 𝑥 while balancing the two conflicting objectives.
min
𝑥∈[0,∞)
𝑥
s. t. 𝜈(𝑥) ≥ 𝛿.
(11)
Lemma 4. The optimal solution to (11) can be obtained by
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑥∣𝜈(𝑥) = 𝛿. (12)
Proof. It can be shown that 𝜈(𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ {𝑇𝑈 , 𝑇𝑅}, is an
increasing function with respect to 𝑥 since 𝑆(𝑥) and 𝑁(𝑥)
are decreasing and increasing functions, respectively, over 𝑥.
4Note that optimising the KUI and MRI are two separate optimisation
problems of 𝑇𝑈 and 𝑇𝑅, respectively. Here, for brevity, let us group these
two problems into one as shown in (10) when 𝑥 = 𝑇𝑈 or 𝑥 = 𝑇𝑅.
5Other techniques used to map the multiobjective optimisation problem
to a single-objective optimisation can be referred to in [18].
Therefore, the optimal solution to (11) can be obtained by
solving the equation 𝜈(𝑥) = 𝛿. The Lemma is proved.
Remark 1. It can be noticed that, if 𝛿 → 0, then solving
(12), i.e. 𝜈(𝑥) → 0, means 𝑁(𝑥) → 0 and 𝑆(𝑥) → 1.
Similarly, if 𝛿 →∞, then we need to solve 𝜈(𝑥)→∞, i.e.
𝑆(𝑥)→ 0 and 𝑁(𝑥)→ 1.
In fact, as shown later in the numerical results, for every
value of 𝛿, the optimal values of 𝑇𝑅 and 𝑇𝑈 are the crossing
points between the line 𝑆(𝑥) = 𝑁(𝑥)/𝛿 and the curve
𝑆(𝑁(𝑇𝑅)) and 𝑆(𝑁(𝑇𝑈 )), respectively.
Remark 2. It can be observed that, by deriving the bounds
of the average NEP and the average SOR in Section III,
the optimisation problem in (11) can be easily solved
numerically (see Lemma 4), rather than performing iterative
searches as in the conventional approach, e.g. [6]. This
not only helps reduce the complexity in finding the optimal
solutions, but also improves the reliability with numerical
approach, which accordingly reflects the novelty of our work
in finding the bounds for the NEP and SOR in Section III.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results of two
performance measures, including NEP and SOR, along with
the optimisation of the KUI and MRI for the handover
security key management.
A. Impacts of KUI and MRI on NEP Performance
Figure 2 plots the average NEP, i.e. 𝐸[𝑁 ] [bits], as a
function of MRI, i.e. 𝑇𝑅 [s], and KUI, i.e. 𝑇𝑈 [s], for various
scenarios of mobility rate, i.e. 𝜇𝑟, and shape parameter,
i.e. 𝑘, of the gamma distribution. It is assumed that the
mean arrival rate of packets exchanged between the UE and
eNodeB is 𝜆𝑝 = 64 kbits/s. In Fig. 2(a), 𝑇𝑈 is set to be 1 s
and 𝑘 varies in {0.02, 0.03, 1}, while three pairs of {𝜇𝑟, 𝑘},
including {𝜇𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑘 = 0.25}, {𝜇𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑘 = 0.5}
and {𝜇𝑟 = 0.5, 𝑘 = 1}, are considered in Fig. 2(b) to
represent various scenarios of 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑘/𝜇𝑟 = {0.5, 1, 2} s.
The upper and lower bounds are plotted using (3), (4) and
(5) derived in Lemmas 1 and 2. It can be observed in both
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) that all the simulation results approach
the derived bounds and the average NEP increases as either
𝑇𝑈 or 𝑇𝑅 increases. This accordingly verifies the statements
in Lemmas 1 and 2 regarding the monotonic increasing
property of 𝐸[𝑁 ] over 𝑇𝑈 and 𝑇𝑅.
B. Impacts of KUI and MRI on SOR Performance
Investigating the impacts of KUI and MRI on the SOR
performance, Fig. 3 plots the average SOR, i.e. 𝐸[𝑆] [bits/s
(bps)], versus 𝑇𝑅 [s] and 𝑇𝑈 [s]. In Fig. 3(a), 𝑇𝑈 is assumed
to vary in {1, 5, 10} s, while in Fig. 3(b), various scenarios
of the pair {𝜇𝑟, 𝑘} are similarly considered as in Fig. 2(b).
The number of bits for authentication between entities in the
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Fig. 2: (a) 𝐸[𝑁 ] versus 𝑇𝑅 w.r.t. 𝑘; (b) 𝐸[𝑁 ] versus 𝑇𝑈
w.r.t. 𝜇𝑟 and 𝑘.
network is set as 𝜌 = 1000 bits. As shown in Figs. 3(a) and
3(b), the average SOR decreases to 0 as either 𝑇𝑈 or 𝑇𝑅
increases and they are all bounded by (6) and (7) when 𝑇𝑈
and 𝑇𝑅 approach to 0, respectively. These verify the findings
in Lemma 3 about the monotonic decreasing property of
𝐸[𝑆] over 𝑇𝑈 and 𝑇𝑅 as well as confirming the derived
upper and lower bounds of 𝐸[𝑆].
C. Optimal KUI and MRI
In order to validate the effectiveness of the derived bounds
in finding the optimal KUI and MRI, Fig. 4 plots the
optimal values of 𝑇𝑅 and 𝑇𝑈 versus the relative importance
ratio between NEP and SOR, i.e. 𝛿, using the proposed
solution and the iterative search approach in [6]. In the
iterative search approach, a running step size of 0.1 second
is assumed, while in the proposed solution, by exploiting the
bounds of 𝐸[𝑁 ] and 𝐸[𝑆] in Figs. 2 and 3, the normalised
NEP and SOR can be determined, and thus the optimal 𝑇𝑅
and 𝑇𝑈 , i.e. 𝑇𝑅,𝑜𝑝𝑡 and 𝑇𝑈,𝑜𝑝𝑡, can be solved numerically
in MATLAB. With the same settings as in Figs. 2 and 3,
Fig. 4(a) shows 𝑇𝑅,𝑜𝑝𝑡 w.r.t. different values of 𝑘, while in
Fig. 4(b), 𝑇𝑈,𝑜𝑝𝑡 w.r.t. various scenarios of 𝜇𝑟 and 𝑘. The
relative importance ratio, i.e. 𝛿, is assumed to vary in the
range from 0.2 to 10 to reflect a variety of requirements in
practice. It can be observed in Fig. 4 that there is a gap
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Fig. 3: (a) 𝐸[𝑆] versus 𝑇𝑅 w.r.t. 𝑇𝑈 ; (b) 𝐸[𝑆] versus 𝑇𝑈
w.r.t. 𝜇𝑟 and 𝑘.
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Fig. 4: (a) Optimal 𝑇𝑅 versus 𝛿; (b) Optimal 𝑇𝑈 versus 𝛿.
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Fig. 5: (a) 𝑆(𝑇𝑅) versus 𝑁(𝑇𝑅) w.r.t. 𝑘 and (b) 𝑆(𝑇𝑈 )
versus 𝑁(𝑇𝑈 ) w.r.t. 𝜇𝑟 and 𝑘.
of up to 1 second between the optimal values of 𝑇𝑈 and
𝑇𝑅 in the proposed solution compared to those in the con-
ventional iterative search approach. This accordingly verifies
the statement in Remark 2 regarding the effectiveness of the
proposed solution in finding the exact optimal values of 𝑇𝑅
and 𝑇𝑈 over the conventional approach which relies solely
on the use of empirical data.
The findings of 𝑇𝑅,𝑜𝑝𝑡 and 𝑇𝑈,𝑜𝑝𝑡 are further illustrated
in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) where the optimal 𝑇𝑅 and 𝑇𝑈 are
determined for every value of 𝛿 (see Lemma 4). It can
be observed in both Figs. 4 and 5 that 𝑇𝑅,𝑜𝑝𝑡 and 𝑇𝑈,𝑜𝑝𝑡
increase as 𝛿 increases. In fact, a higher NEP is required
over the SOR to achieve a higher 𝛿. This means the security
is of lower priority compared to the signalling overhead.
Therefore, the optimal intervals 𝑇𝑈,𝑜𝑝𝑡 and 𝑇𝑅,𝑜𝑝𝑡 must be
long enough to provide a lower 𝐸[𝑆] while sacrificing the
cause of a higher 𝐸[𝑁 ]. This observation verifies the notice
in Remark 1 regarding the impact of 𝛿 as 𝛿 varies from 0
to ∞. This also reflects the observations in Figs. 2 and 3
regarding the contradictory between 𝐸[𝑁 ] and 𝐸[𝑆] when
increasing either 𝑇𝑈 or 𝑇𝑅.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the bounds of NEP and SOR have been
first derived to not only facilitate the normalisation func-
tions in the optimisation problem but also characterise
the monotonicity properties of the NEP and SOR over
the KUI and MRI. It has been shown that the NEP and
SOR are respectively increasing and decreasing functions
of both the KUI and MRI. A multiobjective optimisation
problem has been accordingly proposed to find the optimal
KUI and MRI that minimise NEP and SOR in MME
handover. By specifying a relative importance parameter
to balance two conflicting objectives NEP and SOR, the
multiobjective optimisation problem has been converted to
a single-objective optimisation problem where the optimal
solutions can be found via a simple numerical method with
a lower complexity and a higher accuracy of up to 1 second
rather than performing iterative searches as in conventional
approach.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (1), it can be easily shown that 𝐸[𝑁 ] decreases as
𝜇𝑢 increases, and thus 𝐸[𝑁 ] is an increasing function over
𝑇𝑈 since 𝑇𝑈 = 1/𝜇𝑢. The lower bound of 𝐸[𝑁 ] can thus
be determined when 𝑇𝑈 → 0, i.e. 𝜇𝑢 →∞, as
lim
𝜇𝑢→∞
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 0. (13)
The upper bound of 𝐸[𝑁 ] can be computed by applying
L’Hospital’s Rule when 𝑇𝑈 →∞, i.e. 𝜇𝑢 → 0. Let us define
𝑓1(𝜇𝑢) ≜ 1− 𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢𝑘
(
1−
(
𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟
)𝑘)
, (14)
𝑔1(𝜇𝑢) ≜ 𝜇𝑢. (15)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (1), we have
lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓1(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔1(𝜇𝑢)
= 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓 ′1(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔′1(𝜇𝑢)
= 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓 ′1(𝜇𝑢). (16)
We continue by calculating 𝑓 ′1(𝜇𝑢) as follows:
𝑓 ′1(𝜇𝑢) =
𝜇𝑟
𝑘𝜇2𝑢
− 𝜇
𝑘+1
𝑟
𝑘
1
𝜇2𝑢 (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘
− 𝜇
𝑘+1
𝑟
𝜇𝑢 (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘+1
≜ 𝑓2(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔2(𝜇𝑢)
,
(17)
where
𝑓2(𝜇𝑢) = 𝜇𝑟 (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘+1−𝜇𝑘+1𝑟 (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)−𝑘𝜇𝑢𝜇𝑘+1𝑟 ,
(18)
𝑔2(𝜇𝑢) = 𝑘𝜇
2
𝑢 (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘+1
. (19)
Substituting (17) into (16), we then have
lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓 ′2(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔′2(𝜇𝑢)
= 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓3(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔3(𝜇𝑢)
, (20)
where
𝑓3(𝜇𝑢) ≜ (𝑘 + 1)𝜇𝑟(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)𝑘 − 𝜇𝑘𝑟 , (21)
𝑔3(𝜇𝑢) ≜ 𝑘𝜇𝑢(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)𝑘 [2(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟) + (𝑘 + 1)𝜇𝑢] . (22)
Similarly, we can arrive at
lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓 ′3(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔′3(𝜇𝑢)
= 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓4(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔4(𝜇𝑢)
(23)
where
𝑓4(𝜇𝑢) ≜ (𝑘 + 1)𝜇𝑟(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)𝑘−1, (24)
𝑔4(𝜇𝑢) ≜ (𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)𝑘 [(𝑘 + 3)𝜇𝑢 + 2𝜇𝑟]
+ 𝑘𝜇𝑢(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘−1 [(𝑘 + 3)𝜇𝑢 + 2𝜇𝑟]
+ 𝜇𝑢(𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟)
𝑘(𝑘 + 3).
(25)
Finally, we obtain
lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 𝜆𝑝 lim
𝜇𝑢→0
𝑓 ′4(𝜇𝑢)
𝑔′4(𝜇𝑢)
= 𝜆𝑝
(𝑘 + 1)𝜇𝑟𝜇
𝑘−1
𝑟
2𝜇𝑘+1𝑟
=
𝜆𝑝(𝑘 + 1)
2𝜇𝑟
. (26)
Equivalently, (13) and (26) can be stated as
𝑁
(𝑇𝑈 )
min = lim
𝑇𝑈→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] = 0 (27)
and
𝑁 (𝑇𝑈 )max = lim
𝑇𝑈→∞
𝐸[𝑁 ] =
𝜆𝑝(𝑘 + 1)
2𝜇𝑟
. (28)
Hence, the Lemma is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From (1), it can be shown that 𝐸[𝑁 ] increases as either 𝑘
increases or 𝜇𝑟 decreases. Therefore, 𝐸[𝑁 ] is an increasing
function over 𝑇𝑅 since 𝑇𝑅 = 𝑘/𝜇𝑟.
Considering both 𝑘 and 𝜇𝑟, we have the following cases:
i) 𝑘 →∞ or 𝜇𝑟 → 0: we have 𝑇𝑅 →∞, and thus
𝑁 (𝑇𝑅)max = lim
𝑘→∞
𝐸[𝑁 ] = lim
𝜇𝑟→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
. (29)
ii) 𝑘 → 0: we have 𝑇𝑅 → 0 and
𝑁
(𝑇𝑅)
min = lim
𝑘→0
𝐸[𝑁 ] =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
(
1− 𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢
lim
𝑘→0
𝑓5(𝑘)
𝑔5(𝑘)
)
, (30)
where
𝑓5(𝑘) ≜ 1−
(
𝜇𝑟
𝜇𝑢 + 𝜇𝑟
)𝑘
, (31)
𝑔5(𝑘) ≜ 𝑘. (32)
It can be seen that 𝑓5(𝑘) → 0 and 𝑔5(𝑘) → 0 as 𝑘 → 0.
By taking the derivative of both 𝑓5(𝑘) and 𝑔5(𝑘) as in the
L’Hospital’s Rule, we can obtain 𝑁 (𝑇𝑅)min as in (5).
iii) 𝜇𝑟 →∞: we have 𝑇𝑅 → 0 and
𝑁
(𝑇𝑅)
min = lim𝜇𝑟→∞
𝐸[𝑁 ] =
𝜆𝑝
𝜇𝑢
(
1− 1
𝑘𝜇𝑢
lim
𝜇𝑟→∞
𝑓6(𝜇𝑟)
𝑔6(𝜇𝑟)
)
,
(33)
where 𝑓6(𝜇𝑟) has the same form as 𝑓5(𝑘) in (31) and
𝑔6(𝜇𝑟) = 1/𝜇𝑟. (34)
It can be seen that 𝑓6(𝜇𝑟)→ 0 and 𝑔6(𝜇𝑟)→ 0 as 𝜇𝑟 →∞.
Similarly, using the L’Hospital’s Rule, we can show that
𝑁
(𝑇𝑅)
min = 0 as 𝜇𝑟 →∞.
Summarising the above cases, the Lemma is proved.
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